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Abstract—The cloud-enabled Internet of controlled things
(IoCT) envisions a network of sensors, controllers, and actua-
tors connected through a local cloud in order to intelligently
control physical devices. Because cloud services are vulnerable
to advanced persistent threats (APTs), each device in the IoCT
must strategically decide whether to trust cloud services that
may be compromised. In this paper, we present iSTRICT, an
interdependent strategic trust mechanism for the cloud-enabled
IoCT. iSTRICT is composed of three interdependent layers. In
the cloud layer, iSTRICT uses FlipIt games to conceptualize
APTs. In the communication layer, it captures the interaction be-
tween devices and the cloud using signaling games. In the physical
layer, iSTRICT uses optimal control to quantify the utilities in
the higher level games. Best response dynamics link the three
layers in an overall “game-of-games,” for which the outcome is
captured by a concept called Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE). We
prove the existence of a GNE under a set of natural assumptions
and develop an adaptive algorithm to iteratively compute the
equilibrium. Finally, we apply iSTRICT to trust management
for autonomous vehicles that rely on measurements from remote
sources. We show that strategic trust in the communication layer
achieves a worst-case probability of compromise for any attack
and defense costs in the cyber layer.
Index Terms—Internet of controlled things, cyber-physical sys-
tems, strategic trust, cybersecurity, advanced persistent threats,
autonomous vehicles, game-of-games
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) will impact a diverse set of
consumer, public sector, and industrial systems. Smart homes
and buildings, autonomous vehicles and transportation [1], and
the interaction between wearable fitness devices and social net-
works [2] provide a few examples of application areas which
will be particularly impacted by the IoT. One definition of
the IoT is a “dynamic global network infrastructure with self-
configuring capabilities based on standard and interoperable
communication protocols where physical and virtual ‘things’
have identities, physical attributes, and virtual personalities”
[3]. This definition envisions a decentralized, heterogeneous
network with plug-and-play capabilities. The related concept
of cyber-physical systems (CPS) refers to “smart networked
systems with embedded sensors, processors, and actuators”
[4]. [5] provides a detailed introduction to CPS and reports
on its development status. The term CPS emphasizes the
“systems” nature of these networks. In both IoT and CPS,
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Fig. 1: iSTRICT addresses security and trust issues for a cloud-enabled IoCT.
The cloud-enabled IoCT consists of connected sensors and devices, with a
cloud as the interface. Adversaries are capable of compromising cloud services
and modifying the control signals that they transmit to the devices. The trust
issue lies between the cloud (sender) and IoCT (receiver). Each IoCT device
should determine which signals to trust from cloud services strategically.
“the joint behavior of the ‘cyber’ and physical elements
of the system is critical—computing, control, sensing, and
networking can be integrated into every component” [4]. The
importance of sensing, actuation, and control to devices in the
IoT has given rise to the term “Internet of controlled things,”
or IoCT. Hereafter, we refer to the IoCT as a way to address
challenges of both CPS and IoT.
The IoCT requires an interface between heterogeneous com-
ponents. Local clouds (or fogs or cloudlets) offer promising
solutions. In these networks, a cloud provides services for
data aggregation, data storage, and computation. In addition,
the cloud provides a market for the services of software
developers and computational intelligence experts [6]. Figure
1 depicts a cloud-enabled IoCT. In this network, sensors
push environment data to the cloud, where it is aggregated
and sent to devices (or “things”), which use the data for
feedback control. These devices modify the environment, and
the cycle continues. Note that the control design of the IoCT
is distributed, since each device can determine which cloud
services to use for feedback control.
A. Advanced Persistent Threats in the Cloud-Enabled IoCT
Unfortunately, cyberattacks on the cloud are increasing as
more businesses utilize cloud services [7]. To provide reliable
support for IoCT applications, sensitive data provided by the
cloud services needs to be well protected [8]. In this paper
we focus on the attack model of advanced persistent threats
(APTs): “cyber attacks executed by sophisticated and well-
resourced adversaries targeting specific information in high-
profile companies and governments, usually in a long term
campaign involving different steps” [9]. In the initial stage of
an APT, an attacker penetrates the network through techniques
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such as social engineering, malicious hardware injection, theft
of cryptographic keys, or zero-day exploits [10]. For example,
the Naikon APT, which targeted governments around the South
China Sea in 2010-2015, used a bait document that appeared
to be a Microsoft Word file but which was actually a malicious
executable that installed spware [11]. The cloud is particularly
vulnerable to initial penetration through application-layer at-
tacks, because many applications are required for developers
and clients to interface with the cloud. Our iSTRICT can be
applied to many cyberattack scenarios. For example, cross-
site scripting (XSS) and SQL injection are two types of
application-layer attacks. In SQL injection, attackers insert
malicious SQL code into fields which do not properly process
string literal escape characters. The malicious code targets
the server, where it could be used to modify data or bypass
authentication systems. By contrast, XSS targets the execution
of code in the browser on the client side. All of these attacks
give attackers an initial entry point into a system, from which
they can begin to gain more complete, insider control. This
control of the cloud can be used to transmit malicious signals
to CPS and cause physical damage.
B. Strategic Trust
Given the threat of insider attacks on the cloud, each IoCT
device must decide which signals to trust from cloud services.
Trust refers to positive beliefs about the perceived reliability
of, dependability of, and confidence in another entity [12].
These entities may be agents in an IoCT with misaligned
incentives. Many specific processes in the IoCT require trust,
such as data collection, aggregation and processing, privacy
protection, and user-device trust in human-in-the-loop inter-
actions [13]. While many factors influence trust, including
subjective beliefs, we focus on objective properties of trust.
These include 1) reputation, 2) promises, and 3) interaction
context. Many trust management systems are based on tracking
reputation over multiple interactions. Unfortunately, agents in
the IoCT may interact only once, making reputation difficult to
accrue [14]. This property of IoCT also limits the effectiveness
of promises such as contracts or policies. Promises may not be
enforceable for entities that interact only once. Therefore we
focus on strategic trust that is predictive rather than reactive.
We use game-theoretic utility functions to capture the moti-
vations for entities to be trustworthy. These utility functions
change based on the particular context of the interaction. In
this sense, our model of strategic trust is incentive-compatible,
i.e., consistent with each agent acting in its own self-interest.
C. Game-Theoretic iSTRICT Model
We propose a framework called iSTRICT, which is com-
posed of three interacting layers: a cloud layer, a commu-
nication layer, and a physical layer. In the first layer, the
cloud-services are threatened by attackers capable of APTs
and defended by network administrators (or “defenders”). The
interaction at each cloud-service is modeled using the FlipIt
game recently proposed by Bowers et al. [10] and van Dijk et
al. [15]. iSTRICT uses one FlipIt game per cloud-service.
In the communication layer, the cloud-services—which may
be controlled by the attacker or defender according to the
outcome of the FlipIt game—transmit information to a
device which decides whether to trust the cloud-services.
This interaction is captured using a signaling game. At the
physical layer, the utility parameters for the signaling game are
determined using optimal control. The cloud, communication,
and physical layers are interdependent. This motivates an
overall equilibrium concept called Gestalt Nash equilibrium
(GNE). GNE requires each game to be solved optimally given
the results of the other games. Because this is a similar idea
to best-response in Nash equilibrium, we call the multi-game
framework a game-of-games.
D. Contributions
In summary, we present the following contributions:
1) Trust Model: We develop a multi-layer framework
(iSTRICT) and associated equilibrium concept (GNE)
to capture interdependent strategic trust in the cloud-
enabled IoCT. iSTRICT combines analysis at the cloud,
communication, and physical layers.
2) GNE Analysis: We prove the existence of GNE, and
we show that strategic trust in the communication layer
guarantees a worst-case probability of compromise re-
gardless of attack costs in the cyber layer.
3) Adaptive Algorithm: We present an adaptive algorithm
using best-response dynamics to compute a GNE.
4) Autonomous Vehicle Application: We simulate the
control of a pair of autonomous vehicles using iSTRICT,
and show improvement over the performance under
naive policies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II,
we give a broad outline of the iSTRICT model. Section III
presents the details of the FlipIt game, signaling game,
physical layer control system, and equilibrium concept. Then,
in Section IV, we study the equilibrium analytically using an
adaptive algorithm. Finally, we apply the framework to the
control of autonomous vehicles in Section V.
E. Related Work
Designing trustworthy cloud service systems has been inves-
tigated extensively in the literature. Various methods, including
a feedback evaluation component, Bayesian game, and domain
partition have been proposed [16]–[18]. Trust models to pre-
dict the cloud trust values (or reputation) can be mainly divided
into objective and subjective classes. The first are based on
the quality of service parameters, and the second are based on
feedback from cloud service users [16], [19].
In the IoCT, however, agents may not have sufficient number
of interactions, which makes reputation challenging to obtain
[14]. In addition, trust value-based cloud trust management
systems can be compromised by reputation attacks through
fake feedback which can severely degrade the system perfor-
mance [16], [20]. Therefore, in this work, we aim to design a
strategic trust mechanism which is predictive rather than reac-
tive through an integrative game-theoretic framework. Rather
than using trust value [20], [21], IoCT devices in our iSTRICT
model make decisions based on the strategies of players at
the cloud layer as well as based on the physical system
performance. This multi-layer design provides resilience to
reputation attacks.
Cyber-physical systems security becomes a critical concern
due to the prevailing threats from both cyber and physical
components in the system [22]–[24]. To facilitate a secure
system design, game theory has been widely adopted to model
and capture the strategic interactions between the attackers and
defenders [25]–[27]. Our iSTRICT framework builds on two
existing game models. One is the signaling game which has
been used in intrusion detection systems [28] and network
defense [29]. The other one is the FlipIt game [10], [15]
which has been applied to security of a single cloud service
[25], [30] as well as AND/OR combinations of cloud services
[31]. In contrast to previous works, in this paper we propose a
three-layer interdependent model to enable devices to decide
whether to trust cloud services that may be compromised.
Specifically, trust management decisions are coupled by the
dynamics of cloud-enabled devices, because data provided by
the cloud services is used for feedback control. Devices must
balance the need for as many data sources as possible (in
order to increase the quality of the feedback control) with
the imperative to reject data sources that are compromised by
attackers.
In terms of the technical framework, iSTRICT builds on
existing achievements in IoCT architecture design [6], [32]–
[34], which describe the roles of different layers of the IoCT
at which data is collected, processed, and accessed by devices
[33]. Each layer of the IoCT consists of different enabling
technologies such as wireless sensor networks and data man-
agement systems [34]. Our perspective, however, is distinct
from this literature because we emphasize an integrated math-
ematical framework. iSTRICT leverages game theory to obtain
optimal defense strategies for IoCT components, and it uses
control theory to quantify the performance of devices.
II. ISTRICT OVERVIEW
We consider a cyber-physical attack in which an adversary
penetrates a cloud service in order to transmit malicious
signals to a physical device and cause improper operation.
This type of cross-layer attack is increasingly relevant in IoCT
settings. Perhaps the most famous cross-layer attack is the
Stuxnet attack that damaged Iran’s nuclear program. But even
more recently, an attacker allegedly penetrated the supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that controls the
Bowman Dam, located less than 20 miles north of Manhattan.
The attacker gained control of a sluice gate which manages
water level1 [35]. Cyber-physical systems ranging from the
smart grid to public transportation need to be protected from
similar attacks.
The iSTRICT framework offers a defense-in-depth approach
to IoCT security. In this section, we introduce each of the
three layers of iSTRICT very briefly, in order to focus on the
interaction between the layers. We describe an equilibrium
1The sluice gate happened to be disconnected for manual repair at the time,
however, so the attacker could not actually change water levels.
TABLE I: Nomenclature
Notation Meaning
S = {1, 2, . . . , N} Cloud services (CSs)
Ai, Di, i ∈ S, R Attackers, defenders, device
vA = [viA]i∈S Values of CSs for A
vD = [viD]i∈S Values of CSs for D
pA = [piA]i∈S Probabilities that A controls CSs
pD = [piD]i∈S Probabilities that D controls CSs
pi∗A = T
Fi (viA, v
i
D) FlipIt mapping for CS i
(v∗A, v
∗
D) ∈ TS(pA) Signaling game mapping
f iA, f
i
D Frequencies Ai and Di
u
Fi
A (f
i
A, f
i
D) Ai’s utility in FlipIt game i
u
Fi
D (f
i
A, f
i
D) Di’s utility in FlipIt game i
θ = [θi]i∈S Types of CSs
θi ∈ Θ = {θA, θD} Type spaces of CSs
m = [mi]i∈S Messages from CSs
mi ∈M = {mL,mH} Low or high risk message
a = [ai]i∈S Actions for CSs
ai ∈ A = {aT , aN} Trust or not trust action
u
Si
A (m,a), u
Si
D (m,a) Signaling game utility of Ai and Di
uSR(θ,m, a) Signaling game utility for R
σiA(m) ∈ ΣA Signaling game mixed strategies of Ai
σiD(m) ∈ ΣD Signaling game mixed strategies of Di
σR(a |m) ∈ ΣNR Signaling game mixed strategy for R
µ(θ |m) = [µi(θ |m)]i∈S Beliefs of R about CSs
u¯
Si
A (σR;σ
i
A, σ
−i
A ;σ
−i
D ) Signaling game utility for Ai
u¯
Si
D (σR;σ
−i
A ;σ
i
D, σ
−i
D ) Signaling game utility for Di
x[k], xˆ[k], u[k], State, estimated state, control
∆iA[k], ∆
i
D[k], bias terms of Ai and Di
Ξθ[k] cloud type matrix
y[k], y˜[k], Measurements without and with biases
ξ, ζ Covariance matrices of noises
ν[k],  Innovation, innovation thresholds
DσR (ν[k]) Innovation gate
viAD = v
i
A/v
i
D, i ∈ S Ratios of CSs’ value for Ai and Di
Vi, PRi Spaces of viAD and p
i
A in a GNE
pi∗A = T˜
Fi (viAD) Redefined FlipIt mapping for CS i
v∗AD ∈ T˜S(pA) Redefined signaling game mapping
v∗AD ∈ T˜S◦F (vAD) Composition of T˜Fi , i ∈ S and T˜S
v†AD ∈ T˜S◦F (v†AD) Fixed-point requirement for a GNE
concept for the simultaneous steady-state of all three layers.
Later, Section III describes each layer in detail. Table I lists
the notation for the paper.
A. Cloud Layer
Consider a cloud-enabled IoCT composed of sensors that
push data to a cloud, which aggregates the data and sends
it to devices. For example, in a cloud-enabled smart home,
sensors could include lighting sensors, temperature sensors,
and blood pressure or heart rate sensors that may be placed on
the skin or embedded within the body. Data from these sensors
is processed by a set of cloud services S = {1, . . . , N} , which
make data available for control.
For each cloud service i ∈ S, let Ai denote an attacker
who attempts to penetrate the service using zero-day exploits,
social engineering, or other techniques described in Section I.
Similarly, let Di denote a defender or network administrator
attempting to maintain the security of the cloud service. Ai
and Di attempt to claim or reclaim control of the each cloud
service at periodic intervals. We model the interactions at all
of the services using FlipIt games, one for each of the N
services.
In the FlipIt game [10], [15], an attacker and a defender
gain utility proportional to the amount of time that they
control a resource (here a cloud service), and pay attack costs
proportional to the number of times that they attempt to claim
or reclaim the resource. We consider a version of the game
in which the attacker and defender are restricted to attacking
at fixed frequencies. The equilibrium of the game is a Nash
equilibrium.
Let viA ∈ R and viD ∈ R denote the values of each cloud
service i ∈ S to Ai and Di, respectively. These quantities
represent the inputs of the FlipIt game. The outputs of
the FlipIt game are the proportions of time for which Ai
and Di control the cloud service. Denote these proportions by
piA ∈ [0, 1] and piD = 1 − piA, respectively. To summarize
each of the FlipIt games, define a set of mappings TFi :
R× R→ [0, 1] , i ∈ S, such that
pi∗A = T
Fi
(
viA, v
i
D
)
(1)
maps the values of cloud service i for Ai and Di to the pro-
portion of time pi∗A for which the service will be compromised
in equilibrium. We will study this mapping further in Section
III-A.
B. Communication Layer
In the communication layer, the cloud services i ∈ S, which
each may be controlled by Ai or Di, send data to a device R,
which decides whether to trust the signals. This interaction is
modeled by a signaling game. The signaling game sender is
the cloud service. The two types of the sender are attacker or
defender. The signaling game receiver is the device R. While
we used N FlipIt games to describe the cloud layer, we
use only one signaling game to describe the communication
layer, because R must decide which services to trust all at
once.
The prior probabilities in the communication layer are the
equilibrium proportions piA and p
i
D = 1 − piA, i ∈ S from
the equilibrium of the cloud layer. Denote the vectors of
the prior probabilities for each sensor by pA =
[
piA
]
i∈S ,
pD =
[
piD
]
i∈S . These prior probabilities are the inputs of
the signaling game.
The outputs of the signaling game are the equilibrium
utilities received by the senders. Denote these utilities by viA
and viD, i ∈ S. Importantly, these are the same quantities
that describe the incentives of A and D to control each cloud
service in the FlipIt game, because the party which controls
each service is awarded the opportunity to be the sender in
the signaling game. Define vectors to represent each of these
utilities by vA =
[
viA
]
i∈S , vD =
[
viD
]
i∈S .
Finally, let TS : [0, 1]N → P(R2N ) be a mapping that
summarizes the signaling game, where P(X) is the power set
of X. According to this mapping, the set of vectors of signaling
game equilibrium utility ratios v∗A and v
∗
D that result from the
vector of prior probabilities pA is given by
(v∗A, v
∗
D) = T
S (pA) . (2)
This mapping summarizes the signaling game. We study the
mapping in detail in Section III-B.
Gestalt Nash Equilibrium Concept
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Fig. 2: In iSTRICT, FlipIt games model attacks on the set of cloud services.
TFi , i ∈ S, map the value of each service to the proportion of time that it
will be compromised in equilibrium. The communication layer is modeled by
a signaling game. TS maps probabilities of compromise to the value of each
cloud service. The cloud layer and communication layer are interdependent.
The physical layer performance quantifies the utilities for the signaling game.
C. Physical Layer
Many IoCT devices such as pacemakers, cleaning robots,
appliances, and electric vehicles are dynamic systems that op-
erate using feedback mechanisms. The physical-layer control
of these devices requires remote sensing of the environment
and the data stored or processed in the cloud. The security
at the cloud and the communication layers of the system are
intertwined with the performance of the controlled devices at
the physical layer. Therefore the trustworthiness of the data has
a direct impact on the control performance of the devices. This
control performance determines the utility of the device R as
well as the utility of each of the attackers Ai and defenders Di.
The control performance is quantified using a cost criterion for
observer-based optimal feedback control. The observer uses
data from the cloud services that R elects to trust, and ignores
the cloud services that R decides not to trust. We study the
physical layer control in Section III-C.
D. Coupling of the Cloud and Communication Layers
Clearly, the cloud and communication layers are coupled
through Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). The cloud layer security serves
as an input to the communication layer. The resulting utilities
of the signaling game at the communication layer further
becomes an input to the FlipIt game at the cloud layer.
In addition, the physical layer performance quantifies the
utilities for the signaling games. Fig. 2 depicts this concept.
In order to predict the behavior of the whole cloud-enabled
IoCT, iSTRICT considers an equilibrium concept which we
call Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE). Informally, a triple(
p†A, v
†
A, v
†
D
)
is a GNE if it simultaneously satisfies Eq. (1)
and Eq. (2).
GNE is useful for three reasons. First, cloud-enabled IoCT
networks are dynamic. The modular structure of GNE requires
the FlipIt games and the signaling game to be at equilib-
rium given the parameters that they receive from the other type
of game. This imposes the requirement of perfection, in the
sense that each game must be optimal given the other game.
In GNE, perfection applies in both directions, because there is
no clear chronological order or directional flow of information
between the two games. Actions in each sub-game must be
chosen by prior-commitment relative to the results of the other
sub-game.
Second, GNE draws upon established results from FlipIt
games and signaling games instead of attempting to ana-
lyze one large game. IoCT networks promise plug-and-play
capabilities, in which devices and users are easily able to
enter and leave the network. This also motivates plug-and-play
availability of solution concepts. The solution to one sub-game
should not need to be totally recomputed if an actor enters or
leaves another subgame. GNE follows this approach.
Finally, GNE serves as an example of a solution approach
which could be called game-of-games. The equilibrium so-
lutions to the FlipIt games and signaling game must be
rational “best responses” to the solution of the other type of
game.
III. DETAILED ISTRICT MODEL
In this section, we define more precisely the three layers of
the iSTRICT framework.
A. Cloud Layer: FlipIt Game
We use a FlipIt game to model the interactions between
the attacker and the defender over each cloud service.
1) FlipIt Actions: For each service, Ai and Di choose
f iA and f
i
D, the frequencies with which they claim or reclaim
control of the service. These frequencies are chosen by prior
commitment. Neither player knows the other player’s action
when she makes her choice. Figure 3 depicts the FlipIt
game. The green boxes above the horizontal axis represent
control of the service by Di and the red boxes below the axis
represent control of the service by Ai.
From f iA and f
i
D, it is easy to compute the expected
proportions of the time that A and D control service i [10],
[15]. Let R+ denote the set of non-negative real numbers.
Define the function ρ : R+ × R+ → [0, 1] , such that
piA = ρ
(
f iA, f
i
D
)
gives the proportion of the time that Ai
will control the cloud service if he attacks with frequency
f iA and Di renews control of the service (through changing
cryptographic keys or passwords, or through installing new
hardware) with frequency f iD. We have
ρ
(
f iA, f
i
D
)
=

0, if f iA = 0,
fiA
2fiD
, if f iD ≥ f iA > 0,
1− fiD
2fiA
, if f iA > f
i
D ≥ 0.
(3)
Notice that when f iA > f
i
D ≥ 0, i.e., the attacking frequency
of Ai is greater than the renewal frequency of Di, the
proportion of time that service i is insecure is ρ
(
f iA, f
i
D
)
> 12 ,
and when f iD ≥ f iA > 0, we obtain ρ
(
f iA, f
i
D
) ≤ 12 .
2) FlipIt Utility Functions: Recall that viA and v
i
D
denote the value of controlling service i ∈ S for Ai and Di,
respectively. These quantities define the heights of the red and
green boxes in Fig. 3. Denote the costs of renewing control of
the cloud service for the two players by αiA and α
i
D. Finally,
let u¯FiA : R+×R+ → R and u¯FiD : R+×R+ → R be expected
utility functions for each FlipIt game. The utilities of each
player are given in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) by the values viD and
viA of controlling the service multiplied by the proportions p
i
D
and piA with which the service is controlled, minus the costs
αiD and α
i
A of attempting to renew control of the service.
u¯FiD
(
f iA, f
i
D
)
= viD
(
1− ρ (f iA, f iD))− αiDf iD. (4)
u¯FiA
(
f iA, f
i
D
)
= viAρ
(
f iA, f
i
D
)− αiAf iA. (5)
Therefore, based on the attacker’s action f iA, the defender
determines f iD strategically to maximize the proportional time
of controlling the cloud service i, 1−ρ(f iA, f iD), and minimize
the cost of choosing f iD.
Note that in the game, the attacker knows viA and α
i
A,
and the defender knows viD and α
i
D. Furthermore, ρ(f
i
A, f
i
D)
is public information, and hence both players know the fre-
quencies of control of the cloud through (3). Therefore, the
communication between two players at the cloud layer is not
necessary when determining their strategies.
3) FlipIt Equilibrium Concept: The equilibrium concept
for the FlipIt game is Nash equilibrium, since it is a
complete information game in which strategies are chosen by
prior commitment.
Definition 1. (Nash Equilibrium) A Nash equilibrium of the
FlipIt game played for control of service i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
is a strategy profile
(
f i∗A , f
i∗
D
)
such that
f i∗D ∈ arg max
fiD∈R+
u¯FiD
(
f i∗A , f
i∗
D
)
, (6)
f i∗A ∈ arg max
fiA∈R+
u¯FiA
(
f i∗A , f
i∗
D
)
, (7)
where u¯FiD and u¯
Fi
A are computed by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
From the equilibrium frequencies f i∗D and f
i∗
A , let the
equilibrium proportion of time that Ai controls cloud service
i be given by pi∗A according to Eq. (3). The Nash equilibrium
solution can then be used to determine the mapping in Eq. (1)
from the cloud service values viA and v
i
D to the equilibrium
attacker control proportion pi∗A , where T
Fi : R × R → [0, 1].
The TFi mappings, i ∈ S, constitute the top layer of Fig. 2.
B. Communication Layer: Signaling Game
Because the cloud services are vulnerable, devices which
depend on data from the services should rationally decide
whether to trust them. This is captured using a signaling
game. In this model, the device R updates a belief about the
state of each cloud service and decides whether to trust it.
Figure 4 depicts the actions that correspond to one service
of the signaling game. Compared to the trust value-based
cloud trust management system where the reputation attack
can significantly influence the trust decision [16], [20], in
time
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iSTRICT, R’s decision is based on the strategies of each
Ai and Di at the cloud layer as well as the physical layer
performance, and hence it does not depend on the feedback
of cloud services from users which could be malicious due to
attacks. We next present the detailed model of signaling game.
1) Signaling Game Types: The types of each cloud service
i ∈ S are θi ∈ Θ = {θA, θD} , where θi = θA indicates that
the service is compromised by Ai, and θ = θD indicates that
the service is controlled by Di. Denote the vector of all the
service types by θ =
[
θi
]
i∈S ,
[
θ1 θ2 . . . θm
]T
.
2) Signaling Game Messages: Denote the risk level of the
data from each service i by mi ∈ M = {mL,mH} , where
mL and mH indicate low-risk and high-risk messages, respec-
tively. (We define this risk level in Section III-C.) Further,
define the vector of all of the risk levels by m =
[
mi
]
i∈S .
Next, define mixed strategies for Ai and Di. Let σiA :
M → [0, 1] and σiD : M → [0, 1] be functions such that
σiA
(
miA
) ∈ ΣA and σiD (miD) ∈ ΣD give the proportions
with which Ai and Di send messages with risk levels miA and
miD, respectively, from each cloud service i that they control.
Note that R only observes miA or miD, depending on who
controls the service i. Let
mi =
{
miA, if θ
i = θA
miD, if θ
i = θD
,
denote risk level of the message that R actually observes.
Finally, define the vector of observed risk levels by m =[
mi
]
i∈S .
3) Signaling Game Beliefs and Actions: Based on the risk
levels m that R observes, it updates its vector of prior beliefs
pA. Define µi : Θ → [0, 1] , such that µi
(
θ |mi) gives the
belief ofR that service i ∈ S is of type θ given thatR observes
risk level mi. Also write the vector of beliefs as µ (θ |m) =[
µi
(
θi |mi)]
i∈S . As a direction for future work, we note that
evidence-based signaling game approaches could be used to
update belief in a manner robust to reputation attacks [29],
[36], [37].
Based on these beliefs, R chooses which cloud services to
trust. For each service i,R chooses ai ∈ A = {aT , aN} where
aT denotes trusting the service (i.e., using it for observer-based
optimal feedback control) and aN denotes not trusting the ser-
vice. Assume that R, aware of the system dynamics, chooses
actions for each service simultaneously, i.e., a =
[
ai
]
i∈S .
Next, define σR : AN → [0, 1] such that σR (a |m) ∈ ΣNR
gives the mixed strategy probability with which R plays the
vector of actions a given the vector of risk levels m.
4) Signaling Game Utility Functions: Let R’s utility func-
tion be denoted by uSR : Θ
N ×MN × AN → R, such that
uSR (θ,m, a) gives the utility that R receives when θ is the
vector of cloud service types, m is the vector of risk levels,
and R chooses the vector of actions a.
For i ∈ S, define the functions uSiA : MN × AN → R and
uSiD : M
N × AN → R, such that uSiA (m, a) and uSiD (m, a)
give the utility that Ai and Di receive for service i when the
risk levels are given by the vector m, and R plays the vector
of actions a.
Next, consider expected utilities based on the strategies of
each player. Let u¯SR : Σ
N
R → R denote the expected utility
function for R, such that u¯SR (σR |m,µ (• |m)) gives R’s
expected utility when he plays mixed strategy σR given that
he observes risk levels m and has belief µ. We have
u¯SR (σR |m,µ) =
∑
θ∈Θm
∑
a∈Am
uSR (θ,m, a)µ (θ |m)σR (a |m) .
(8)
In order to compute the expected utility functions for
Ai and Di, define σ−iA =
{
σjA | j ∈ S\{i}
}
and σ−iD ={
σjD | j ∈ S\{i}
}
, the sets of the strategies of all of the
senders except the sender on cloud service i. Then define u¯SiA :
ΣNR × ΣNA × ΣN−1D → R such that u¯SiA
(
σR;σiA, σ
−i
A ;σ
−i
D
)
gives the expected utility to Ai when he plays mixed strategy
σiA, and the attackers and defenders on the other services
play σ−iA and σ
−i
D . Define the expected utility to Di by
u¯SiD
(
σR;σ−iA ;σ
i
D, σ
−i
D
)
in a similar manner.
Let X i ∈ {A,D} denote the player that controls service i
and X ∈ {A,D}N denote the set of players that control each
service. Then the expected utilities are computed by
u¯SiA
(
σR;σiA, σ
−i
A ;σ
−i
D
)
=
∑
m∈MN
∑
a∈AN∑
X 1∈{A,D}
. . .
∑
X i−1∈{A,D}
∑
X i+1∈{A,D}
. . .
∑
XN∈{A,D}
uSiA (m, a)σR (a |m)σiA
(
mi
) ∏
j∈S\{i}
σjX j
(
mj
)
pjX j , (9)
u¯SiD
(
σR;σ−iA ;σ
i
D, σ
−i
D
)
=
∑
m∈MN
∑
a∈AN∑
X 1∈{A,D}
. . .
∑
X i−1∈{A,D}
∑
X i+1∈{A,D}
. . .
∑
XN∈{A,D}
uSiD (m, a)σR (a |m)σiD
(
mi
) ∏
j∈S\{i}
σjX j
(
mj
)
pjX j . (10)
5) Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Conditions: Finally,
we can state the requirements for a perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (PBNE) for the signaling game [38].
Definition 2. (PBNE) For the device, let u¯SR (σR |m,µ)
be formulated according to Eq. (8). For each service
i ∈ S, let u¯SiA
(
σR;σiA, σ
−i
A ;σ
−i
D
)
be given by Eq. (9)
and u¯SiD
(
σR;σ−iA ;σ
i
D, σ
−i
D
)
be given by Eq. (10). Finally,
let vector pA give the prior probabilities of each ser-
vice being compromised. Then, a perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the signaling game is a strategy pro-
file
(
σ∗R;σ
1∗
A , . . . σ
N∗
A ;σ
1∗
D , . . . σ
N∗
D
)
and a vector of beliefs
µ (θ |m) such that the following hold:
∀i ∈ S, σi∗A (•) ∈ arg max
σiA∈ΣA
u¯SiA
(
σ∗R;σ
i
A, σ
−i∗
A ;σ
−i∗
D
)
, (11)
∀i ∈ S, σi∗D (•) ∈ arg max
σiD∈ΣD
u¯SiD
(
σ∗R;σ
−i∗
A ;σ
i
D, σ
−i∗
D
)
, (12)
∀m ∈M, σ∗R ∈ arg max
σR∈ΣmR
u¯SR (σR |m,µ (• |m)) , (13)
and ∀i ∈ S,
µi
(
θA |mi
)
=
σi∗A
(
mi
)
piA
σi∗A (mi) p
i
A + σ
i∗
D (mi)
(
1− piA
) , (14)
if σi∗A
(
mi
)
piA+σ
i∗
D
(
mi
)
piD 6= 0, and µi
(
θA |mi
) ∈ [0, 1] , if
σi∗A
(
mi
)
piA+ σ
i∗
D
(
mi
)
piD = 0. Additionally, µ
i
(
θD |mi
)
=
1− µi (θA |mi) in both cases.
Note that we have denoted the equilibrium utilities for Ai
and Di, i ∈ S by
viA = u¯
Si
A
(
σ∗R;σ
i∗
A , σ
−i∗
A ;σ
−i∗
D
)
, (15)
viD = u¯
Si
D
(
σ∗R;σ
−i∗
A ;σ
i∗
D , σ
−i∗
D
)
, (16)
and the vectors of those values by vA =
[
viA
]
i∈S , vD =[
viD
]
i∈S . We now have the complete description of the sig-
naling game mapping Eq. (2), where TS : [0, 1]N → P(R2N ).
This mapping constitutes the middle layer of Fig. 2.
C. Physical Layer: Optimal Control
The utility function uSR (θ,m, a) is determined by the per-
formance of the device controller as shown in Fig. 2. A block
illustration of the control system is shown in Fig. 5. Note that
the physical system in the diagram refers to the IoCT devices.
1) Device Dynamics: Each device in the IoCT is governed
by dynamics. We can capture the dynamics of the things by
the linear system model
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] +Bu[k] + w[k], (17)
where A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×q , x[k] ∈ Rn is the system
state, u[k] ∈ Rq is the control input, w[k] denotes the system
white noise, and x[0] = x0 ∈ Rn is given. Let y[k] ∈ RN
represent data from cloud services which suffers from white,
additive Gaussian sensor noise given by the vector v[k]. We
have y[k] = Cx[k] + v[k], where C ∈ RN×n is the output
matrix. Let the system and sensor noise processes have known
covariance matrices E {w[k]w′[k]} = ξ, E {v[k]v′[k]} = ζ,
where ξ and ζ are symmetric, positive, semi-definite matrices,
and w′[k] and v′[k] denote the transposes of the noise vectors.
In addition, for each cloud service i ∈ S, the attacker Ai and
defender Di in the signaling game choose whether to add bias
terms to the measurement yi[k]. Let ∆iA[k],∆
i
D[k] ∈ R denote
these bias terms. The actual noise levels that R observes
depends on who controls the service in the FlipIt game.
Recall that the vector of types of each service is given by
θ =
[
θi
]
i∈S . Let 1{•} represent the indicator function, which
takes the value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise.
Then, define the matrix
Ξθ = diag
{[
1{θ1=θA} . . . 1{θN=θA}
]}
.
Including the bias term, the measurements are given by
y˜[k] = Cx[k]+v[k]+Ξθ[k]∆A[k]+(I − Ξθ[k]) ∆D[k], (18)
where I is the N -dimensional identity matrix.
2) Observer-Based Optimal Feedback Control: Let F, Q,
and R be positive-definite matrices of dimensions n×n, n×n,
and q× q, respectively. The device chooses the control u that
minimizes the operational cost given by
J = E
{
x′[T ]Fx[T ] +
T−1∑
k=0
x′[k]Qx[k] + u′[k]Ru[k]
}
,
(19)
subject to the dynamics of Eq. (17).
To attempt to minimize Eq. (19), the device uses observer-
based optimal feedback control. Define P [k] by the forward
Riccati difference equation
P [k + 1] = A
(
P [k]− P [k]C ′
(CP [k]C ′ + ξ)−1 CP [k]
)
A′ + ζ,
with P [0] = E{(x[0] − xˆ[0])(x[0] − xˆ[0])′}, and let L[k] =
P [k]C ′(CP [k]C ′+ξ)−1. Then the observer is a Kalman filter
given by [39]
xˆ[k + 1] = Axˆ[k] +Bu[k] + L[k] (y˜[k]− Cxˆ[k]) .
3) Innovation: In this context, the term y˜[k] − Cxˆ[k] is
the innovation. Label the innovation by ν[k] = y˜[k]− Cxˆ[k].
This term is used to update the estimate xˆ[k] of the state. We
consider the components of the innovation as the signaling-
game messages that the device decides whether to trust. Let
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Fig. 5: A block diagram shows the various components of the control system in the iSTRICT. The physical system refers to IoCT device whose states are
collected by sensors. Each Ai and Di in the cloud layer can add bias terms to the measured senor data before sending it to the receiver. R decides whether
to trust or not trust each of the cloud services, and then designs an optimal control for the physical system. Since the optimal control is designed over a
finite-horizon cost criterion, the loop terminates after T time steps.
us label each component of the innovation as low-risk or high-
risk. For each i ∈ S, we classify the innovation as
mi =
{
mL, if
∣∣νi[k]∣∣ ≤ i
mH , if
∣∣νi[k]∣∣ > i ,
where  ∈ RN++ is a vector of thresholds. Since R is
strategic, it chooses whether to incorporate the innovations
using the signaling game strategy σR(a |m), given the vector
of messages m.
Define a strategic innovation filter by DσR : RN → RN
such that, given innovation ν, the components of gated inno-
vation ν¯ = DσR(ν) are given by
ν¯i =
{
νi, if ai = aT
0, otherwise
,
for i ∈ S. Now we incorporate the function DσR into the
estimator by
xˆ[k + 1] = Axˆ[k] +Bu[k] + L[k]DσR (ν[k]) .
4) Feedback Controller: The optimal controller is given by
the feedback law u[k] = −K[k]xˆ[k], with gain
K[k] = (B′[k]S[K + 1]B +R)−1B′S[k + 1]A,
where S[k] is obtained by the backward Riccati difference
equation
S[k] = A′
(
S[k + 1]− S[k + 1]B
(B′S[k + 1]B +R)−1B′S[k + 1]
)
A+Q,
with S[T ] = F.
5) Control Criterion to Utility Mapping: The control cost
J determines the signaling game utility of the device R.
This utility should be monotonically decreasing in J. We
consider a mapping J 7→ uSR defined by uSR (θ,m, a) =
(v¯R − vR)e−βRJ + v¯R, where v¯R and vR denote maximum
and minimum values of the utility, and βR represents the
sensitivity of the utility to the control cost.
D. Definition of Gestalt Nash Equilibrium
We now define the equilibrium concept for the overall
game, which is called Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE). To
differentiate with the equilibria in FlipIt game and signaling
game, we use notations with a superscript † to emphasize the
solution at GNE.
Definition 3. (Gestalt Nash equilibrium) The triple(
p†A, v
†
A, v
†
D
)
, where p†A represents the probability of
compromise of each of the cloud services, and v†A and v
†
D
represent the vectors of equilibrium utilities for Ai and Di,
i ∈ S, constitutes a Gestalt Nash equilibrium of the overall
game if both Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) are satisfied:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} , pi†A = TFi
(
vi†A , v
i†
D
)
, (20)


v1†A
v2†A
...
vN†A
 ,

v1†D
v2†D
...
vN†D

 ∈ TS


p1†A
p2†A
...
pN†A

 . (21)
According to Definition 3, the overall game is at equilibrium
when, simultaneously, each of the FlipIt games is at
equilibrium and the one signaling game is at equilibrium.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we give conditions under which a GNE
exists. We start with a set of natural assumptions. Then we
narrow the search for feasible equilibria. We show that the
signaling game only supports pooling equilibria, and that only
low-risk pooling equilibria survive selection criteria. Finally,
we create a mapping that composes the signaling and FlipIt
game models. We show that this mapping has a closed graph,
and we use Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem to prove the
existence of a GNE. In order to avoid obstructing the flow
of the paper, we briefly summarize the proofs of each lemma,
and we refer readers to the GNE derivations for a single cloud
service in [25] and [40].
TABLE II: Assumptions
# Assumption (∀i ∈ S)
A1 0 = uSiA (mL, aN ) = u
Si
A (mH , aN ) = u
Si
D (mL, aN ) = u
Si
D (mH , aN ) .
A2 0 < uSiA (mL, aT ) < u
Si
D (mH , aT ) < u
Si
D (mL, aT ) < u
Si
A (mH , aT ) .
A3 ∀θ−i,m−i, a−i, uSR (θ,m, a¯) > uR (θ,m, a˜) , where θi = θA, mi = mH , a¯−i = a˜−i = a−i, a¯i = aN , and a˜i = aT .
A4 ∀θ−i,m−i, a−i, uSR (θ,m, a¯) < uSR (θ,m, a˜) , where θi = θD, mi = mL, a¯−i = a˜−i = a−i, a¯i = aN , and a˜i = aT .
A5 ∀θ,m−i, a−i, uSR (θ, m¯, a) > uSR (θ, m˜, a) , where ai = aT , m¯−i = m˜−i = m−i, m¯i = mL, and m˜i = mH .
A. Assumptions
For simplicity, let the utility functions of each signaling
game sender i be dependent only on the messages and actions
on cloud service i. That is, ∀i ∈ S, uSiA (m, a) ≡ uSiA (mi, ai)
and uSiD (m, a) ≡ uSiD (mi, ai). This can be removed, but
it makes analysis more straightforward. Table II gives five
additional assumptions. Assumption A1 assumes that each Ai
and Di, i ∈ S, get zero utility when their messages are not
trusted. A2 assumes an ordering among the utility functions
for the senders in the signaling game. It implies that a) Ai
and Di get positive utility when their messages are trusted;
b) for trusted messages, A prefers mH to mL; and c) for
trusted messages, D prefers mL to mH . These assumptions
are justified if the goal of the attacker is to cause damage (with
a high-risk message), while the defender is able to operate
under normal conditions (with a low-risk message).
Assumptions A3-A4 give natural requirements on the utility
function of the device. First, the worst case utility for R is
trusting a high-risk message from an attacker. Assume that, on
every channel i ∈ S, regardless of the messages and actions
on the other channels, R prefers to play ai = aN if mi = mH
and θi = θA. This is given by A3. Second, the best case utility
for R is trusting a low-risk message from a defender. Assume
that, on every channel i ∈ S, regardless of the messages and
actions on the other channels, R prefers to play ai = aT
if mi = mL and θi = θD. This is given by A4. Finally,
under normal operating conditions, R prefers trusted low-risk
messages compared to trusted high risk messages from both
an attacker and a defender. This is given by A5.
B. GNE Existence Proof
We prove the existence of a GNE using Lemmas 1-5 and
Theorem 1.
1) Narrowing the Search for GNE: Lemma 1 eliminates
some candidates for GNE.
Lemma 1. (GNE Existence Regimes [40]) Every GNE
(p†A, v
†
A, v
†
D) satisfies: ∀i ∈ S, viA, viD > 0.
The basic idea behind the proof of Lemma 1 is that viA = 0
or viD = 0 cause either Ai or Di to give up on capturing or
recapturing the cloud. The cloud becomes either completely
secure or completely insecure, neither of which can result in a
GNE. Lemma 1 has a significant intuitive interpretation given
by Remark 1.
Remark 1. In any GNE, for all i ∈ S, R plays ai = aT
with non-zero probability. In other words, R never completely
ignores any cloud service.
2) Elimination of Separating Equilibria: In signaling
games, equilibria in which different types of senders trans-
mit the same message are called pooling equilibria, while
equilibria in which different types of senders transmit distinct
messages are called separating equilibria [38]. The distinct
messages in separating equilibria completely reveal the type
of the sender to the receiver. Lemma 2 is typical of signaling
games between players with opposed incentives.
Lemma 2. (No Separating Equilibria [40])
Consider all pure-strategy signaling-game equilibria(
σ∗R;σ
1∗
A , . . . σ
N∗
A ;σ
1∗
D , . . . σ
N∗
D
)
in which each Ai and
Di, i ∈ S, receive positive expected utility. All such equilibria
satisfy σi∗A (m) = σ
i∗
D (m) for all m ∈ M and i ∈ S. That is,
the senders on each cloud service i use pooling strategies.
Lemma 2 holds because it is never incentive-compatible for
an attacker Ai to reveal his type, in which case R would not
trust Ai. Hence, Ai always imitates Di by pooling.
3) Signaling Game Equilibrium Selection Criteria: Four
pooling equilibria are possible in the signaling game: Ai and
Di transmit mi = mL and R plays ai = aT (which we
label EQ-L1), Ai and Di transmit mi = mL and R plays
ai = aN (EQ-L2), Ai and Di transmit mi = mH and R
plays ai = aT (EQ-H1), and Ai and Di transmit mi = mH
and R plays ai = aN (which we label EQ-H2). In fact, the
signaling game always admits multiple equilibria. Lemma 3
performs equilibrium selection.
Lemma 3. (Selected Equilibria) The intuitive criterion [41]
and the criterion of first mover advantage imply that equilibria
EQ-L1 and EQ-L2 will be selected.
Proof: The first mover advantage states that, if both Ai
and Di prefer one equilibrium over the others, they will choose
the preferred equilibrium. Thus, Ai and Di will always choose
EQ-L1 or EQ-H1 if either of those is admitted. When neither
is admitted, we select EQ-L22. When both are admitted, we
use the intuitive criterion to select among them. Assumption
A2 states that Ai prefers EQ-H1, while Di prefers EQ-L1.
Thus, if a sender deviates from EQ-H1 to EQ-L1, R can
infer that the sender is a defender, and trust the message.
Therefore, the intuitive criterion rejects EQ-H1 and selects
EQ-L1. Finally, Assumption A5 can be used to show that EQ-
H1 is never supported without EQ-L1. Hence, only EQ-L1
and EQ-L2 survive the selection criteria.
At the boundary between the parameter regime that supports
EQ-L1 and the parameter regime that supports EQ-L2, R can
choose any mixed strategy, in which he plays both ai = aT
2This is without loss of generality, since A1 implies that the sender utilities
are the same for EQ-L2 and EQ-H2.
and ai = aN with some probability. Indeed, for any cloud
service i ∈ S, hold pjA, j 6= i and j ∈ S, constant, and let piA
denote the boundary between the EQ-L1 and EQ-L2 regions.
Then Remark 2 gives an important property of piA .
Remark 2. By Lemma 1, all GNE satisfy piA ≤ piA . Therefore,
piA is a worst-case probability of compromise.
Remark 2 is a result of the combination of the signaling
and FlipIt games. Intuitively, it states that strategic trust
in the communication layer is able to limit the probability of
compromise of a cloud service, regardless of the attack and
defense costs in the cyber layer.
4) FlipIt Game Properties: For the FlipIt games on
each cloud service i ∈ S, denote the ratio of attacker and
defender expected utilities by viAD = v
i
A/v
i
D. For i ∈ S,
define the set Vi by
Vi =
{
v ∈ R+ : 0 ≤ v ≤ uSiA (mL, aT )/uSiD (mL, aT )
}
.
Also define the set PRi, i ∈ S, by PRi ={
p ∈ [0, 1] : 0 < p < TFi
(
uSiA (mL, aT ), u
Si
D (mL, aT )
)}
.
Next, for i ∈ S, define modified FlipIt game mappings
T˜Fi : Vi → PRi, where
pi∗A = T˜
Fi
(
viAD
) ⇐⇒ pi∗A ∈ TFi (viA, viD) . (22)
Then Lemma 4 holds.
Lemma 4. (Continuity of T˜Fi [25]) For i ∈ S, T˜Fi(viAD) is
continuous in viAD ∈ Vi.
The dashed curve in Fig. 6 gives an example of T˜Fi for
i = 1. The independent variable is on the vertical axis, and
the dependent variable is on the horizontal axis.
5) Signaling Game Properties: Let vAD = [viAD]i∈S, V =∏
i∈SVi, and PR =
∏
i∈S PR
i. Define a modified signaling
game mapping by T˜S : PR→ P(V) such that
v∗AD ∈ T˜S (pA) ⇐⇒ (v∗A, v∗D) ∈ TS (pA) , (23)
where TS selects the equilibria given by Lemma 3. Then we
have Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. (Properties of T˜S) Construct a graph
G =
{
(pA, v∗AD) ∈ PR× V : v∗AD ∈ T˜S (pA)
}
,
The graph G is closed. Additionally, for every pA ∈ PR, the
set of outputs of T˜S(pA) is non-empty and convex.
Proof: The graph G is closed because it contains all of
its limit points. The set of outputs is non-empty because a
signaling game equilibrium exists for all pA. It is convex
because expected utilities for mixed-strategy equilibria are
convex combinations of pure strategy utilities and because
assumption A2 implies that convexity also holds for the ratio
of the utilities.
The step functions (plotted with solid lines) in Figure 6 plot
example mappings from p1A on the horizontal axis to v
1
AD
on the vertical axis for vAD ∈ T˜S(pA), holding piA, i ∈
{2, 3, . . . , N} fixed. It is clear that the graphs are closed.
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Fig. 6: The (solid) step-functions depict modified signaling game mappings
T˜S for five different sets of parameters. The (dashed) curve depicts a modified
FlipIt game mapping T˜F1 . The intersection is a GNE. The figure shows
only one dimension out of N dimensions.
6) Fixed-Point Theorem: By combining Eq. (20-21) with
Eq. (22) and Eq. (23), we see that the vector of equilibrium
utility ratios v†AD = [v
i†
AD]i∈S in any GNE (p
†
A, v
†
A, v
†
D) must
satisfy

v1†AD
v2†AD
...
vN†AD
 ∈ T˜S


T˜F1
(
v1†AD
)
T˜F2
(
v2†AD
)
...
T˜F2
(
vN†AD
)

 .
Denote this composed mapping by T˜S◦F : V → P(V)
such that the GNE requirement can be written by v†AD ∈
T˜S◦F (v†AD). Figure 6 gives a one-dimensional intuition be-
hind Theorem 2. The example signaling game step functions
T˜S have closed graphs, and the outputs of the functions are
non-empty and convex. The FlipIt curve T˜F1 is continu-
ous. The two mappings are guaranteed to intersect, and the
intersection is a GNE.
According to Lemma 5, the graph G of the signaling game
mapping is closed, and the set of outputs of T˜S is non-empty
and convex. Since each modified FlipIt game mapping T˜Fi ,
i ∈ S is a continuous function, each T˜Fi produces a closed
graph and has non-empty and (trivially) convex outputs. Thus,
the graph of the composed mapping, T˜S◦F , is also closed, and
has non-empty and convex outputs. Because of this, we can
apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem, famous for its use in
proving Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. (Kakutani Fixed-Point Theorem [42]) - Let Φ be
a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of some Euclidean
space Rn. Let Z : Φ → P(Φ) be a set-valued function on
Φ with a closed graph and the property that, for all φ ∈ Φ,
Z(φ) is non-empty and convex. Then Z has a fixed point.
The mapping T˜S◦F is a set-valued function on V, which is
a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of RN . T˜S◦F also
has a closed graph, and the set of its outputs is non-empty and
convex. Therefore, T˜S◦F has a fixed-point, which is precisely
the definition of a GNE. Hence, we have Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. (GNE Existence) Let the utility functions in the
signaling game satisfy Assumptions A1-A5. Then a GNE exists.
Proof: The proof has been constructed from Lemmas 1-5
and Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1 Adaptive defense algorithm for iSTRICT
1) Initialize parameters αiA, α
i
D, p
i
A, p
i
D, ∀i ∈ S, in each
FlipIt game, and σiA and σ
i
D, ∀i ∈ S, σR in the
signaling game
Signaling game:
2) Solve optimization problems in Eq. (11) and Eq. (12),
respectively, and obtain σi∗A and σ
i∗
D , ∀i ∈ S
3) Update belief µi(θA |mi) based on Eq. (14), and
µi(θD |mi) = 1− µi(θA |mi), ∀i ∈ S
4) Solve receiver’s problem in Eq. (13) and obtain σ∗R
5) If σi∗A , σ
i∗
D , σ
∗
R do not change, go to step 6; otherwise,
go back to step 2
6) Obtain viA and v
i
D, ∀i ∈ S, from Eq. (15) and Eq. (16),
respectively
FlipIt game:
7) Solve defenders’ and attackers’ problems in Eq. (6) and
Eq. (7) jointly, and obtain f i∗A and f
i∗
D , ∀i ∈ S
8) Map the frequency pair (f i∗A , f
i∗
D ) to the probability pair
(pi∗A , p
i∗
D ) through Eq. (3), ∀i ∈ S
9) If (pi∗D , p
i∗
A), ∀i ∈ S, do not change, go to step 10;
otherwise, go back to step 2
10) Return p†A := p
∗
A, σ
i†
A := σ
i∗
A , σ
i†
D := σ
i∗
D , ∀i ∈ S, and
σ†R := σ
∗
R
C. Adaptive Algorithm
Numerical simulations suggest that Assumptions A1-A5
often hold. If this is not the case, however, Algorithm 1
can be used to compute the GNE. The main idea of the
adaptive algorithm is to update the strategic decision-making
of different entities in iSTRICT iteratively.
Given the probability vector pA, Lines 2-5 of Algorithm
1 compute a PBNE for the signaling game which consists
of the strategy profile
(
σ∗R;σ
1∗
A , . . . σ
N∗
A ;σ
1∗
D , . . . σ
N∗
D
)
and
belief vector µ (θ |m) . The algorithm computes the PBNE
iteratively using best response. The vectors of equilibrium
utilities (v∗A, v
∗
D) are given by Eq. (15) and Eq. (16). Using
(v∗A, v
∗
D) , Line 7 of Algorithm 1 updates the equilibrium
strategies of the FlipIt games and arrives at a new prior
probability pair (pi∗A , p
i∗
D ), ∀i ∈ S, through the mapping in
Eq. (3). This initializes the next round of the signaling game
with the new (pi∗A , p
i∗
D ). The algorithm terminates when the
probabilities remain unchanged between rounds.
To illustrate Algorithm 1, we next present an example in-
cluding N = 4 cloud services. The detailed physical meaning
of each service will be presented in Section V. Specifically,
the costs of renewing control of cloud services are α1A = $2k,
α2A = $0.8k, α
3
A = $10k, α
4
A = $12k, and α
1
D = $0.2k,
α1D = $0.1k, α
1
D = $0.05k, α
1
D = $0.03k, for the attackers
and defenders, respectively. The initial proportions of time
of each attacker and defender controlling the cloud services
are p1A = 0.2, p
2
A = 0.4, p
3
A = 0.6, p
4
A = 0.15, and
p1D = 0.8, p
2
D = 0.6, p
3
D = 0.4, p
4
D = 0.85, respectively.
For the signaling game at the communication layer, the initial
probabilities that attacker sends low-risk message at each
cloud service are equal to 0.2, 0.3, 0.1, and 0.4, respectively.
Similarly, the defender’s initial probabilities of sending low-
risk message are equal to 0.9, 0.8, 0.95, and 0.97, respectively.
Figure 7 presents the results of Algorithm 1 on this example
system. The result in Fig. 7a shows that the cloud services
1 and 2 can be compromised by the attacker. Figure. 7a
shows the device’s belief on the received information. At the
GNE, the attacker also sends low-risk message to deceive the
receiver and gain utility when controlling the cloud service.
Four representative devices’ actions are shown in Fig. 7b,
where the devices strategically reject low-risk message in
some cases due to the couplings between layers in iSTRICT.
Because of the large attack and defense cost ratios and the
crucial impact on physical system performance of services 3
and 4, p3D = p
4
D = 1, insuring a secure information provision.
In addition, the defense strategies at the cloud layer and the
communication layer are adjusted adaptively according to the
attackers’ behaviors. Within each layer, all players are required
to best respond to the strategies of the other players. This
cross-layer approach enables a defense-in-depth mechanism
for the devices in iSTRICT.
V. APPLICATION TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE CONTROL
In this section, we apply iSTRICT to a cloud-enabled
autonomous vehicle network in which the framework of ve-
hicular cloud computing is similar to the one in [43]. Two au-
tonomous vehicles use an observer to estimate their positions
and velocities based on measurements from six sources, four
of which may be compromised. They also implement optimal
feedback control based on the estimated state.
A. Autonomous Vehicle Security
Autonomous vehicle technology will make a powerful im-
pact on several industries. In the automotive industry, tra-
ditional car companies as well as technology firms such
as Google [44] are racing to develop autonomous vehicle
technology. Maritime shipping is also an attractive application
of autonomous vehicles. Autonomous ships are expected to be
safer, higher-capacity, and more resistant to piracy attacks [45].
Finally, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have the potential
to reshape fields such as mining, disaster relief, and precision
agriculture [46].
Nevertheless, autonomous vehicles pose clear safety risks.
In ground transportation, in March of 2018, an Uber self-
driving automobile struck and killed a pedestrian [47]. On
the sea, multiple crashes of ships in the Unites States Navy
during 2017 [48] have prompted concerns about too much
reliance on automation. In the air, cloud-enabled UAVs could
be subject to data integrity or availability attacks [49]. In
general, autonomous vehicles rely on many remote sources
(e.g., other vehicles, GPS signals, location-based services)
for information. In the most basic case, these sources are
subject to errors that must be handled robustly. In addition,
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Fig. 7: Adaptive Algorithm with four cloud services. (a) and (b) depict each
device’s belief and action, respectively. (c) shows the result of cloud security.
The algorithm converges to a GNE in four steps, where one step represents
a round of updates including the FlipIt game and signaling game.
the sources could also be selfish and strategic. For instance,
an autonomous ship could transmit its own coordinates dishon-
estly in order to clear its own shipping path of other vessels.
In the worst case, the sources could be malicious. An attacker
could use a spoofed GPS signal in order to destroy a UAV or
to use the UAV to attack another target. In all of these cases,
autonomous vehicles must decide whether to trust the remote
sources of information.
𝑥1[𝑘]
𝑥4[𝑘]
𝑥2[𝑘]
𝑥3[𝑘]
𝑢1[𝑘]
𝑢2[𝑘]
Fig. 8: We use bicycle steering models from [50] to conceptually capture
the vehicle dynamics. The vehicle states are given by x1[k] : first vehicle
position, x2[k] : first vehicle angle; x3[k] : offset between vehicles; x4[k] :
second vehicle angle. Controls u1[k] and u2[k] represent the steering angles
of the first and second vehicles, respectively.
𝑦1[𝑘]
𝑦2[𝑘]
𝑦3[𝑘]
𝑦4[𝑘]
𝑦5[𝑘]
𝑦6[𝑘]
Fig. 9: Local sensors include a localization camera on vehicle 1 and a range
finding device on vehicle 2. Remote sensors include magnetic compass sensors
and GPS receivers on both vehicles.
B. Physical-Layer Implementation
We consider an interaction between nine agents. Two au-
tonomous vehicles implement observer-based optimal feed-
back control according to the iSTRICT framework. Each
vehicle has two states: position and angle. Thus, the combined
system has the state vector x[k] ∈ R4 described in Fig. 8. The
states evolve over finite horizon k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}.
These states are observed through both remote and local
measurements. Figure 9 describes these measurements. The
local measurements y5[k] and y6[k] originate from sensors
on the autonomous vehicle, so these are secure. Hence, the
autonomous vehicle always trusts y5[k] and y6[k]. In ad-
dition, while the magnetic compass sensors are subject to
electromagnetic attack, this involves high attack costs α3A and
α4A. The defense algorithm yields that R always trusts y3[k]
and y4[k] at the GNE. The remote measurements y˜1[k] and
y˜2[k] are received from cloud services that may be controlled
by defenders D1 and D2, or that may be compromised by
attackers A1 and A2.
In the signaling game, attackers A1 and A2 may add bias
terms ∆1A[k] or ∆
2
A[k] if θ
1 = θA or θ2 = θA, respectively.
Therefore, the autonomous vehicles must strategically decide
whether to trust these measurements. Each y˜i[k], i ∈ {1, 2},
is classified as a low-risk (mi = mL) or high-risk (mi =
mH) message according to an innovation filter. R decides
whether to trust each message according to the action vector
a = [ a1 a2 ]′, where a1, a2 ∈ {aN , aT }. We seek an
equilibrium of the signaling game that satisfies Definition 2.
C. Signaling Game Results
Figure 10 depicts the results of three different signaling-
game strategy profiles for the attackers, defenders, and device,
using the software MATLAB [51]. The observer and controller
are linear, so the computation is rapid. Each iteration of the
computational elements of the control loop depicted in Fig. 5
takes less than 0.0002s on a Lenovo ThinkPad L560 laptop
with 2.30 GHz processor and 8.0 GB of installed RAM.
In all of the scenarios, we set the position of the first vehicle
to a track a reference trajectory of x1[k] = 4, the offset
between the second vehicle and the first vehicle to track a
reference trajectory of x3[k] = 8, and both angles to target
x2[k] = x4[k] = 0. Column 1 depicts a scenario in which
A1 and A2 send mH and R plays a1 = a2 = aT . The
spikes in the innovation represent the bias terms added by
the attacker when he controls the cloud. The spikes in Fig.
10(a) are large because these the attacker adds bias terms
corresponding to high risk messages. These bias terms cause
large deviations in the position and angle from their desired
values (Fig. 10(d)). For instance, at time 10, the two vehicles
come within approximately 4 units of each other.
Column 2 depicts the best response of R to this strategy.
The vehicle uses an innovation filter (here, at 1 = 2 = 10)
which categorizes the biased innovations as mH . The best
response is to choose
σR
([
aT
aT
]
|
[
mL
mL
])
= σR
([
aT
aN
]
|
[
mL
mH
])
= 1,
σR
([
aN
aT
]
|
[
mH
mL
])
= σR
([
aN
aN
]
|
[
mH
mH
])
= 1,
i.e., to trust only low-risk messages. The circled data points in
Fig. 10(b) denote high-risk innovations from the attacker that
are rejected. Figure 10(e) shows that this produces very good
results in which the positions of the first and second vehicle
converge to their desired values of 4 and −4, respectively, and
the angles converge to 0.
But iSTRICT assumes that the attackers are also strategic.
A1 and A2 realize that high-risk messages will be rejected,
so they add smaller bias terms ∆1A[k] and ∆
2
A[k] which
are classified as mL. This is depicted by Fig. 10(c). It is
not optimal for the autonomous vehicle to reject all low-risk
messages, because most such messages come from a cloud
controlled by the defender. Therefore, the device must play
a1 = a2 = aT . Nevertheless, Fig. 10(f) shows that these
low-risk messages create significantly less disturbance than
the disturbances from high-risk messages in Fig. 10(d). In
summary, the signaling-game equilibrium is for A1, A2, D1,
and D2 to transmit low-risk messages and for R to trust
low-risk messages while rejecting high-risk messages off the
equlibrium path.
D. Results of the FlipIt Games
Meanwhile, A1 and D1 play a FlipIt game for control
of Cloud Service 1, and A2 and D2 play a FlipIt game
for control of Cloud Service 2. Based on the equilibrium of
the signaling game, all players realize that the winners of the
FlipIt games will be able to send trusted low-risk messages,
but not trusted high-risk messages. Based on Assumption A2,
low-risk messages are more beneficial to the defenders than
to the attackers. Hence, the incentives to control the cloud are
larger for defenders than for attackers. This results in a low
p1A and p
2
A from the FlipIt game. If the equilibrium from
the previous subsection holds for these prior probabilities, then
the overall five-player interaction is at a GNE as described in
Definition 3 and Theorem 2.
Table III is useful for benchmarking the performance of
iSTRICT. The table lists the empirical value of the control cri-
terion given by Eq. (19). The first three columns quantify the
performance depicted in Fig. 10. Column 1 is the benchmark
case, in which A1 and A2 add high-risk noise, and the noise
is mitigated somewhat by a Kalman filter, but the bias is not
handled optimally. Column 2 shows the improvement provided
by iSTRICT against a nonstrategic attacker, and Column
3 shows the improvement provided by iSTRICT against a
strategic attacker. The improvement is largest in Column 2,
but it is significant against a strategic attacker as well.
E. GNE for Different Parameters
Now consider a parameter change in which A2 develops
new malware to compromise the GPS position signal y˜2[k] at
a much lower cost α2A. (See Subsection III-A). In equilibrium,
this increases p2A from 0.03 to 0.10. A higher number of
perturbed innovations are visible in Fig. 11(a). This leads to
the poor state trajectories of Fig. 11(d). The control cost from
Eq. (19) increases, and the two vehicles nearly collide at time
8. The large changes in angles show that the vehicles turn
rapidly in different directions.
In this case, R’s best response is
σR
([
aT
aN
]
|
[
mL
mL
])
= σR
([
aT
aN
]
|
[
mL
mH
])
= 1,
σR
([
aN
aN
]
|
[
mH
mL
])
= σR
([
aN
aN
]
|
[
mH
mH
])
= 1,
i.e., to not trust even the low-risk messages from the remote
GPS signal. The circles on ν2[k] for all k in Fig. 11(b)
represent not trusting. The performance improvement can be
seen in Fig. 11(e).
Interestingly, though, Remark 1 states that this cannot be
an equilibrium. In the FlipIt game, A2 would have no
incentive to capture Cloud Service 2, since R never trusts that
cloud service. This would lead to p2A = 0. Moving forward, R
would trust Cloud Service 2 in the next signaling game, and
A2 would renew his attacks. iSTRICT predicts that this pattern
of compromising, not trusting, trusting, and compromising
would repeat in a limit cycle, and not converge to equilibrium.
A mixed-strategy equilibrium, however, does exist. R
chooses a mixed strategy in which he trusts low-risk messages
on Cloud Service 2 with some probability. This probability
incentivizes A2 to attack the cloud with a frequency between
those that best respond to either of R’s pure strategies. At the
GNE, the attack frequency of A2 produces 0 < p2A < 0.10 in
the FlipIt game. In fact, this is the worst case p2A = p
2
A
from Remark 2. In essence, R’s mixed-strategy serves as a
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Fig. 10: Column 1: A1 and A2 send mH and R plays [ aT aT ]′, Column 2: A1 and A2 send mH and R plays [ aN aN ]′, Column 3: A1 and
A2 send mL and R plays [ aT aT ]′. Row 1: Innovation, Row 2: State trajectories.
TABLE III: Control Costs and Benchmarks for the Simulations depicted in Fig. 11-12
Ungated mH Gated mH Trusted mL Trusted, Frequent mL Untrusted, Frequent mL Mixed Trust with mL
Trial 1 274,690 42,088 116,940 185,000 128,060 146,490
Trial 2 425,520 42,517 123,610 211,700 121,910 143,720
Trial 3 119,970 42,444 125,480 213,500 144,090 130,460
Trial 4 196,100 42,910 89,980 239,400 138,350 135,930
Trial 5 229,870 42,733 66,440 94,400 135,160 139,680
Trial 6 139,880 42,412 69,510 2,581,500 119,700 125,270
Trial 7 129,980 42,642 116,560 254,000 138,160 122,790
Trial 8 97,460 42,468 96,520 1,020,000 130,260 146,370
Trial 9 125,490 42,633 50,740 250,900 138,960 151,470
Trial 10 175,670 42,466 78,700 4,182,600 135,780 126,550
Average 191,463 42,531 93,448 923,300 133,043 136,873
last-resort countermeasure to the parameter change due the
new malware obtained by A2.
Figure 11(c) depicts the innovation with a mixed strategy in
whichR sometimes trusts Cloud Service 2. Figure 11(f) shows
the impact on state trajectories. At this mixed-strategy equi-
librium, A1, A2, D1, and D2 choose optimal attack/recapture
frequencies in the cloud-layer and send optimal messages in
the communications layer, and R optimally chooses which
messages to trust in the communication layer based on an
innovation filter and observer-based optimal control in the
physical layer. No players have incentives to deviate from their
strategies at the GNE.
Columns 4-6 of Table III quantify the improvements pro-
vided by iSTRICT in these cases. Column 4 is the benchmark
case, in which an innovation gate forces A2 to add low-risk
noise, but his frequent attacks still cause large damages. Col-
umn 5 gives the performance of iSTRICT against a strategic
attacker, and Column 6 gives the performance of iSTRICT
against a nonstrategic attacker. In both cases, the cost criterion
decreases by a factor of at least six.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
iSTRICT attains robustness through a combination of mul-
tiple, interdependent layers of defense. At the lowest physical
layer, a Kalman filter handles sensor noise. The Kalman filter,
however, is not designed for the large bias terms that can
be injected into sensor measurements by attackers. We use
an innovation gate in order to reject these large bias terms.
But even measurements within the innovation gate should
be rejected if there is a sufficiently high risk that a cloud
service is compromised. We determine this threshold risk
level strategically, using a signaling game. Now, it may not
be possible to estimate these risk levels using past data.
Instead, iSTRICT estimates the risk proactively using FlipIt
games. The equilibria of the FlipIt games depend on the
incentives of the attackers and defenders to capture or reclaim
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Fig. 11: Column 1: Innovation and state trajectories for p2A = 0.10 and R plays [ aT aT ]′, Column 2: Innovation and state trajectories for p2A = 0.10
and R plays [ aT aN ]′, Column 3: Innovation and state trajectories in which R mixes strategies between [ aT aT ]′ and [ aT aN ]′.
the cloud. These incentives result from the outcome of the
signaling game, which means that the equilibrium of the
overall interaction consists of a fixed point between mappings
that characterize the FlipIt games and the signaling game.
This equilibrium is a GNE.
We have proved the existence of GNE under a set of
natural assumptions, and provided an algorithm to iteratively
compute the GNE. We have shown that a device can use
iSTRICT to guarantee a worst-case compromise probability,
even without fully rejecting measurements from any of the
cloud services. Through an application to autonomous vehicle
networks, we have shown the performance gains achieved by
iSTRICT over naive strategies. Because of the modularity of
the GNE concept, the solutions to each layer do not need to be
completely recomputed when devices enter or leave the IoCT.
Future work can extend the framework to a fourth layer
composed of a cloud radio access network and a fifth layer of
resource management for economic and policy issues of the
IoCT. Another promising extension is to incorporate intelligent
control designs that further mitigate the performance loss due
to cyber threats by addressing them at the physical layer.
These future directions would further contribute to policies for
strategic trust management in the dynamic and heterogeneous
IoCT.
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